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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CHESTER B. BRO,VN, ~ 
Appellant, 
v. Case No. 
JOHN l\T. TURNER, \Varden, ( 
11096 
U tab State Prison, ) 
Respondent, 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEl\1EN'l' OF THE NATURE OF CASE 
The appellant, Chester B. Brown, appeals from an 
order denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LO,iVER COURT 
By Order dated November 2, 1967, accompanied 
by Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, bearing 
the same date, Honorable Bryant H. Croft denied 
appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 
1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent submits that the order of the Third 
District Court denying appellant's petition for writ of 
habeas corpus should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT O~"' FACTS 
The respondent submits the following facts as be-
ing more in keeping with the rule that evidence on ap-
peal will be reviewed in a light most favorable to the 
trial court's determination. 
On March 11, 1963, appellant was arraigned in the 
Second Judicial District Court for the crime of issuing 
a check against in~ufficient funds (R.51). At that 
time, appellant was informed by the court that: ( 1) 
It was a felony charge, ( 2) that conviction would mean 
a penitentiary sentence, (3) that appellant was entitled 
to be represented by an attorney, ( 4) that appellant 
need do nothing further until he consulted with an attor-
ney (R.55}. Having been so advised, appellant replied: 
"I waive the attorney" (R.56). 
Appellant admitted that he knew at the time the 
court informed him of his right to counsel that if he 
requested it the court would appoint him counsel 
(R.79}. Appellant testified that he had obtained the 
services of court appointed counsel at least twice pre-
viously, and as early as 1942 knew that he had a right 
to court appointed counsel in felony cases (R.79). Evi-
dence was further adduced that appellant knew the 
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maximum term for the crime charged since he had just 
finished serving a term of from zero to five years at the 
Utah State Prison for the identical crime (R.69). 
On April 28, 1966, appellant came before the Third 
Judicial District Court for trial on charges of robbery 
and grand larceny (R.84). Appellant was represented 
by an able and competent criminal trial advocate who 
was attempting to gain a dismissal of the robbery charge 
and plead guilty to the grand larceny (R.95). At a 
pretrial discussion, appellant not being present, appel-
lant's counsel suggested a plea to the grand larceny 
and counsel for the state was opposed (R.96). The 
court felt that this procedure would be an equitable 
result (T.96). 
Appellant was then questioned in open court con-
cerning a withdrawal of his earlier pleas of not guilty 
to each count and a change to guilty on the grand lar-
ceny (R.86-88). Appellant testified that he did this 
voluntarily: 
Q. So you informed the Court you did this of 
your own volition; is that right? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Did it voluntarily. 
A. Yes, sir. (R.87) 
Appellant further testified that he knew that as 
a result of his guilty plea that he would be returned 
to the Utah State Prison for at least five years (R.88). 
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Appellant's counsel was granted the convenience of 
the record to specifically show the voluntariness of the 
waiver by appellant of his right to a trial on the merits: 
Q. Mr. Brown, you're aware you could have 
a trial on this if you wanted, aren't you? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you' re waiving your right to be tried 
on the robbery and the grand larceny and you're 
willingly waiving right to trial on the grand lar-
ceny and the grand [sic} robbery to enter a plea 
to grand larceny? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And that's what you want to do? 
A. Yes, sir. 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you have been advised by me about 
the various penalties and what will happen? 
A. Yes, sir. (R.88) 
Appellant testified that no member of the judicial 
system had made any promises to him concerning his 
withdrawal of plea or his guilty plea (R.89). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT VOLUNTARILY, KNO,V-
INGLY, AND INTELLIGENTLY WAIVED 
HIS RIGHT TO COUNSEL ON THE 19(-13 
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CIIARGE O.F ISSUING A CHECK AGAINST 
INSUFFICENT FUNDS. 
For his first point on appeal, appellant attempts 
to raise the hue and cry of "no counsel" as grounds for 
reversing the determination of the trial court. Respond-
ent would say only that the facts in the criminal pro-
ceeding as well as testimony adduced at hearing show 
clearly that appellant made a voluntary, knowing, and 
intelligent waiver of his right to the assistance of coun-
sel in 1963. 
Appellant was advised by the trial court at time 
of arraignment: 
The Court informs you emphatically that you 
are entitled to be represented by an attorney, 
if you desire to have the services of an attorney, 
and you need not do anything further in this 
matter - by way of plea or anything else -
until you have consulted an attorney, if it is your 
desire to do so. (R.55) 
Appellant testified at the hearing that he knew at 
the time of this arraignment that if he desired court 
appointed counsel, all he need do was to request it and 
that the court would appoint counsel for him (R.79). 
In State v. Spiers, 12 Utah 2d 14, 361 P.2d 509 
(1961), this court stated at 12 Utah 2d 16: 
The determining factor of whether appellant 
was convicted without due process of law is 
whether there has been an intelligent waiver of 
his rights to counsel. This must depend upon 
the facts and circumstances of each case, includ-
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ing the background, experience and conduct of 
the accused. [Emphasis added.} 
Here, the uncontradicted evidence shows ( 1) that 
appellant had been in prison for thirty-four of his fifty-
five years (R. 59); (2) that he had been convicted of 
at least ten felonies during that period ( R. 73-7 4) ; ( 3) 
that he knew as early as 1942 that the court would ap-
point counsel on felony cases for him if he requested it 
(R.79}. 
During the course of the arraignment, the trial 
court asked appellant three times if he wished an 
attorney: 
Q. You don't want an attorney? 
A. I waive the attorney. 
Q. Notwithstanding the fact that this is a 
felony charge, and carries with it a penitentiary 
sentence, you waive the services of an attorney 
and although you're entitled to a jury trial, you 
also waive that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. You waive the senices of an attorney? 
A. Yes. (R.56) 
In Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1961), the 
United States Supreme Court stated that the record 
must show, or there must be allegation and evidence 
which shows that the accused was offered counsel but 
intelligently and understandingly rejected it. Respond-
ent would submit that this requirement has been met 
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by appellant's own testimony at trial. This admission 
also negates the thrust of Dodge v. Turner, 27 4 1'"'. 
Supp. 285 (D.C. Utah 1967), wherein the court held 
"one cannot understandingly waive a right he does not 
know he has." Appellant did know of his right to court 
appointed counsel and waived it. See Hanks v. State, 
18 Utah 2d 101, 417 P.2d 118 (1966). 
Appellant further claims that he waived the assist-
ance of counsel and plead guilty because of alleged 
threats from police officers that if he did not do so, he 
would be charged as an habitual criminal. It is to be 
noted that appellant claims the identical threat as 
grounds for reversing his 1966 plea ( R. 86) . 
Appellant testified at the hearing that no officer 
of the court of Weber County made any deal with him 
nor did anyone connected with the court coerce him in 
any way in his waiver of counsel or plea entry (R.81). 
The only persons who allegedly talked to him in this 
vein were men he identified as plainclothes officers of 
the check detail ( R. 76). Appellant admitted that 
neither man physically threatened him, only that they 
had a bad reputation (R.77). 
Respondent would submit that the uncorroborated 
and unsupported testimony of petitioner is not suffi-
cient to meet the standard of proof required to justify 
the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. McGuffey v. 
Turner, 18 Utah 2d 354, 423 P.2d 166 (1967). See 
also Syddall v. Turner, ...... Utah 2d ...... , --···- P.2d 
...... (January 30, 1968). 
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A trial court is not required to believe the unsup-
ported testimony of a habeas corpus petitioner even 
though the respondent might not offer any evidence in 
contradiction. Ex parte Farrell, 189 F.2d 540 (1st Cir. 
1951). 
The respondent submits that it is within the discre-
tion of the judge who hears the petition for writ of 
habeas corpus to grant or deny it. Unless there is a clear 
abuse of this discretion, the decision of that court should 
not be overturned. State v. Crank, 105 Utah 322, 142 
P.2d 178 (1943). 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT FULLY COMPLIED 
'VITH THE REQUIRElVIENTS OF UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 77-24-6 (1953) IN ADVISING 
APPELLANT OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF 
A PLEA OF GUILTY. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-24-6 (1953) provides: 
'Vhere defendant is not represented by coun-
sel, the court shall not accept a plea of guilty 
unless it shall have explained to the defendant 
the consequences of such a plea. 
Appellant contends that this section requires that 
a defendant be told of the maximum penalty that can 
be imposed before the court can accept a guilty plea. 
The leading Utah case construing the scope of the 
term "consequence of plea" is State v. Ranford, 13 Utah 
8 
2d 63, 368 P .2d 473 ( 1962) . In that instance, the trial 
court failed to inform Banford that a plea of guilty 
would subject him to a term in the Utah State prison 
and this court reversed the conviction on that basis. 
In this matter the sentencing judge was the same 
judge who erred in Ranford. He was, therefore, very 
careful to comply with this court's ruling when advising 
appellant: 
Now the Court informs you, Mr. Brown, that 
this is a felony charge and that it has with it a 
penitentiary sentence. The Court further in-
forms you that you are entitled to be tried by a 
jury. . . . Notwithstanding the fact that this 
is a felony charge and carries with it a peniten-
tiary sentence you waive the services of an attor-
ney; and although you're entitled to a jury trial, 
you also waive that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. (R.55-56) 
Respondent would submit that the trial court fully 
complied with the spirit and the letter of Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-24-6 (1953), as these are established in the 
Banf ord case. 
Appellant was not a novice before the court. He 
had just recently been released from the Utah State 
Prison after serving three years, eleven months and 
fourteen days on the identical charge of issuing a check 
againt insufficient funds (R.69). Appellant knew the 
sentence for the crime charged. He had served at least 
two terms for the identical crime and had been out of 
prison only seven weeks when he committed the crime 
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charged herein. Appellant admitted at the hearing that 
he knew a plea of guilty would result in his incarcera-
tion at the Utah State Prison: 
Q. Now, Mr. Brown, when you waived this 
attorney, you in fact know that if you were 
found guilty you would go to the state peniten-
tiary; isn't that correct ? 
A. Yes. (R.80) 
Appellant voluntarily plead guilty to the charge 
knowing such a plea would result in imprisonment. He 
knew the consequences of that plea. 
POINT III 
THE APPELLANT ACTED VOLUN-
TARILY, KNOWINGLY AND INTELLI-
GENTLY WHEN HE WAIVED HIS RIGHT 
TO JURY TRIAL AND ENTERED A PLEA 
OF GUILTY TO THE CHARGE OF GRAND 
LARCENY IN 1966. 
For the final point, appellant attempts to convince 
this court that his waiver of a jury trial and his subse-
quent plea of guilty to a charge of grand larceny in 
1966 was in some nebulous way affected by the trial 
court and/ or by threats from Salt Lake City police 
officers to charge appellant as an habitual criminal. 
Respondent would submit that the trial court was 
extremely careful to advise appellant of the conse-
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quences of a plea withdrawal and a subsequent entry 
of a guilty plea: 
THE COURT: .Mr. Brown, listen closely to 
what the Court has to say and I want to be sure 
you' re doing this of your own volition. It is 
contemplated that your attorney has asked that 
you be allowed to withdraw your former plea of 
not guilty to each count and for you to enter a 
plea, different plea to the count of grand larceny. 
Now if this Court grants that motion and allows 
you to do that and you do enter a different plea 
to guilty to the crime of grand larceny you will 
go back to the Utah State Penitentiary. 
THE WITNESS: I automatically go back? 
THE COURT: Yes, and you go back there 
with the recommendation of this Court that you 
serve at least five years on it. Do you under-
stand? 
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. (R.87) 
Counsel for appellant was scrupulous in showing 
the basis and reason for appellant's plea to show its 
voluntariness: 
MR. O'CONNELL: Yes. Mr. Brown, you're 
aware you could have a trial on this if you 
wanted, aren't you? 
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. 
MR. O'CONNELL: And you're waivmg 
your right to be tried on the robbery and the 
grand larceny and you're willingly waiving right 
to trial on the grand larceny and grand robbery 
to enter a plea to grand larceny? 
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THE 'VITNESS: Yes, sir. 
lVIR. O'CONNELL: And you have Leen ad-
vised by me about the various penalties •1nd what 
will happen? 
THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. (R.88) 
There was not one scintilla of evidence adduced at 
the hearing to show that appellant was acting under 
duress when he plead guilty (R.89). Appellant does 
not state one fact that could be used as a basis for the 
trier of fact to determine the plea to be coerced. He 
attempts to show that appellant may have been influ-
enced by the judge sitting in on a pretrial conference 
where appellant's counsel raised the issue of a reduced 
plea; that counsel may have told appellant that the 
judge was in favor of it; that this knowledge could have 
had some influence on appellant. 
This court has pointed out numerous times that it 
will not rely on suppositions as basis for reversing a 
trial court determination. State v. Hamilton, 18 Utah 
2d 234, 419 P.2d 770 (1966). Appellant was given 
every opportunity at the hearing to present facts which 
would support his claim of denial of constitutional 
rights. He completely failed to off er any proof which 
this court could find meets the "clear and convincing 
preponderance of the evidence test" propounded in Mc-
Gu ff ey, supra. 
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CONCLUSION 
Respondent would submit that appellant has totaily 
failed to show any error committed by the trial court. 
The grounds for reversal submitted by appellant are 
wholly without merit. In all stages of the proceedings 
against him, appellant was afforded full and complete 
constitutional safeguards. The decision of the trial 
court denying appellant's petition for writ of habeas 
corpus should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
LEROY S. AXLAND 
Assistant Attorney General 
State of Utah 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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